| 建筑节能激励政策的非对称博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐江,刘应宗,尤爱军.建筑节能激励政策的非对称博弈分析[J].电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2006,8(3):9-12. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐江 刘应宗 尤爱军 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,天津,300072
2. 中国银行河南省分行,郑州,450008 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文探讨了建筑节能领域中政府与房地产商群体之间的非对称博弈问题,分析了该博弈所具有的模仿者动态模型、斯坦克尔伯格模型的特点,并构造了两者关于建筑节能激励政策的非对称博弈模型,最后对双方分别提出了博弈策略建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 建筑节能 非对称博弈 模仿者动态模型 斯坦克尔伯格模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-8105(2006)03-0009-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月9日 |
Asymmetric Game Analysis of Incentive Policy to Buildings Energy Efficiency |
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| XU Jiang,LIU Ying-zong,YOU Ai-jun.Asymmetric Game Analysis of Incentive Policy to Buildings Energy Efficiency[J].Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition),2006,8(3):9-12. |
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| Authors: | XU Jiang LIU Ying-zong YOU Ai-jun |
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| Abstract: | From the bounded rationality of players,an asymmetric game between the colony players of land agents and the government is discussed in the domain of energy efficiency in buildings.The game model has been built which has the characteristics of replicator dynamic model and stackelberg model.In the end,the economic policy for the game players is put forward. |
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| Keywords: | energy efficiency in buildings asymmetric game replicator dynamic model stackelberg model |
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