| 审计市场博弈--中国独立审计行为异化分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张建军,林志伟.审计市场博弈--中国独立审计行为异化分析[J].深圳大学学报(人文社会科学版),2005,22(6):23-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张建军 林志伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 深圳大学经济学院,广东,深圳,518060 |
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| 摘 要： | 上市公司因为存在会计舞弊就可能产生对低质量审计的需求,同时会计师事务所在综合衡量收益成本后产生一定的供给.这两个方面的博弈使得审计行为异化最终发生.审计行为异化不仅有审计行业自身的原因,还有更深刻的制度基础.
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| 关 键 词： | 审计市场 行为异化 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-260X(2005)06-0023-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年10月10 |
The Games in the Audit Market: An Analysis of Behavior Alienation in China's Independent Auditing |
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| ZHANG Jian-jun,LIN Zhi-wei.The Games in the Audit Market: An Analysis of Behavior Alienation in China''''s Independent Auditing[J].Journal of Shenzhen University(Humanities & Social Sciences),2005,22(6):23-29. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Jian-jun LIN Zhi-wei |
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| Abstract: | Accounting Malpractices in Listed companies may produce a need for a low-quality auditing while an accounting firm may supply this low-quality auditing after comprehensively assessing returns and costs.The games of the two sides lead to alienation of auditing behavior at last.This alienation results not only from the trade of auditing itself,but also from the institutional background. |
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| Keywords: | audit market behavior alienation analysis of games |
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