农户信誉特征、还款意愿传递与农户信贷可得——基于信号传递博弈的理论分析和实证检验

本文通过建立信号传递博弈模型,分析信誉作为农户还款意愿的抵押品替代与农户信贷可得之间的内在作用机理,并根据信号传递博弈的均衡分析结论提出研究假设,进一步以农户获得各类荣誉称号、表彰以及他人评价情况作为农户信誉的替代变量,利用河南农户的调查数据进行实证检验。通过Logit回归模型和Tobit回归模型分析发现,农户具有高信誉特征能够有效增加其信贷可得性和信贷额度,表明农户信誉可以作为一种抵押品替代缓解农户所受信贷配给。此外,农户是否获得信用评级、家庭总收入也显著影响农户信贷可得性和信贷额度。研究结论对完善农村金融市场体系,推进金融扶贫工作,振兴乡村经济具有重要的理论价值和现实指导意义。

Reputation,Repayment Willingness and Farmer Households' Credit Availability:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test Based on Signaling Game

Based on the reputation related literature review,this paper builds the signaling game model to analyze the inherentrelation between farmer households’ reputation as collateral substitution and credit availability,and puts forward the corresponding hypotheses.Using the survey data of farmer households in Henan,this paper tests the hypotheses with proxy of reputation measured by farmer households’ reputation title and reputation evaluation. Through the Logit and Tobit regression analysis,it finds that high reputation as collateral substitution signal can effectively alleviate the credit constraints of farmer households,increase farmer households’ credit availability and credit lines. In addition,credit rating and total income also have a significant effect on them. The results have important theoretical and practical significance for improving the rural financial market system,advancing rural financial poverty alleviation work,and revitalizing the rural economy.