| 金融契约、控制权配置与企业过度投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐细雄,刘星.金融契约、控制权配置与企业过度投资[J].管理评论,2012(6):20-26. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐细雄 刘星 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(71102063;71172082);教育部人文社科项目(09YJC630243);教育部博士点基金项目(20100191120041);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(CDJSK11009) |
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| 摘 要： | 以金融契约理论为基础,从控制权视角考察了企业"核心控制权"、"一般控制权"和"现金流权"的交互关系及其对过度投资的影响效应,并利用中国上市公司数据进行实证检验。研究发现:(1)管理者利用控制权地位攫取私利是引发企业过度投资的主要诱因,随着管理者控制权强度增加,过度投资水平明显上升;(2)投资者拥有的核心控制权能够对管理者一般控制权行使产生有效约束,相比较于股权分散、负债较少的企业,股权集中、负债较多企业投资者拥有的核心控制权更集中、干预动机更强,因而企业过度投资水平明显降低。
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| 关 键 词： | 金融契约 过度投资 控制权配置 控制权私利 |
Financial Contract,Allocation of Control Rights and Overinvestment |
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| Xu Xixiong and Liu Xing.Financial Contract,Allocation of Control Rights and Overinvestment[J].Management Review,2012(6):20-26. |
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| Authors: | Xu Xixiong and Liu Xing |
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| Institution: | Xu Xixiong and Liu Xing (School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030) |
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| Abstract: | Based on financial contract theory,we investigate the interactive allocation of "core control right","general control right" and "cash right" and their impacts on overinvestment,and then make an empirical test using the data from listed Chinese companies.The results show that,internal managers practice overinvestment so as to extract private benefits of control and the relationship between overinvestment level and control rights owned by managers is significantly positive.What’s more,with the decrease of debt ratio and ownership concentration,overinvestment resulting from manager control is much more serious. |
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| Keywords: | financial contract overinvestment allocation of control rights private benefits of control |
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