| 国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释 |
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| 引用本文： | 吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11). |
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| 作者姓名： | 吕长江 赵宇恒 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学管理学院;吉林大学管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科规划基金项目(05JA630021); 教育部新世纪优秀人才培养计划的资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文突出管理者权力在企业激励契约中的作用,对不同管理者权力下国有企业高层管理者货币性补偿与企业绩效的关系进行研究。通过理论与实证分析,我们发现,权力强大的管理者可以自己设计激励组合,在获取权力收益的同时实现高货币性补偿,并不需要盈余管理迎合董事会的激励要求;而权力较弱的管理者则更关注货币性补偿,只能通过盈余管理虚构利润,以达到薪酬考核的目的。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理者权力 货币性补偿 权力收益 |
A Study on the Effect of the Incentive Given to Managers of State-owned Enterprises |
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| Lu Changjiang , Zhao Yuheng.A Study on the Effect of the Incentive Given to Managers of State-owned Enterprises[J].Management World,2008(11). |
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| Authors: | Lu Changjiang Zhao Yuheng |
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| Abstract: | We have in this paper emphasized the role in enterprises' incentive contracts played by managers' power and made a study on the relationship, in the context of different power given to different managers, between the monetary compensation given to high-ranking managers of state-owned enterprises and enterprises' performance. We have found that managers themselves with great power can design incentive mix, getting substantial monetary compensation without the need for the earnings control to meet the stimula... |
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