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动态联盟企业的利益分配博弈
引用本文:卢少华,陶志祥.动态联盟企业的利益分配博弈[J].管理工程学报,2004,18(3):65-68.
作者姓名:卢少华  陶志祥
作者单位:1. 东南大学电气工程系,江苏,南京,210096
2. 东南大学ITS研究中心,江苏,南京,210096
摘    要:通过研究供需链上相邻两个企业之间的交易情况对动态联盟的利润分配进行了讨论。指出了动态联盟的利益分配实际上是通过内部供应链上的交易过程得以实现。讨论了成员的产品需求价格弹性与产品的价格和产量、原料消耗率与对上游产品价格的承受能力之间的关系。论证了讨价还价博弈和非合作博弈的不足,指出协商博弈是价格博弈的最佳策略,但是它往往缺乏稳定性。

关 键 词:动态联盟  虚拟企业  利益分配  博弈论
文章编号:1004-6062(2004)03-0065-04
修稿时间:2002年10月15

Profit-allotting Game in Virtual Enterprise
LU Shao-hua,TAO Zhi-xiang.Profit-allotting Game in Virtual Enterprise[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2004,18(3):65-68.
Authors:LU Shao-hua  TAO Zhi-xiang
Abstract:Studied the strategy of profit allotting among virtual enterprise by learning of the bargaining between two members. Pointed out that profit allotting is realized through trades among members. The relation between members' demand price elasticity and the price and quantity they accept in trading, and that between member's materials consuming rate and their price-bearing capability, have been studied. Proved that bargain and non-cooperate game will lead to X-inefficiency,and pointed out that cooperatio game works the best, but less stably.
Keywords:virtual enterprise  profit-allotting  game theory  
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