不同减排合同下企业间纵向持股对供应链决策的影响

本文针对节能服务公司融资难、回款难及其与用户之间缺乏信任等现象,结合实际中节能服务公司与制造企业采取的不同减排合同机制,分别构建了减排效益分享型合同和减排量保证型合同下企业间纵向持股的三级低碳供应链模型,并对比分析了不同减排合同下持股策略对供应链企业决策及利润的影响。通过模型分析并结合案例及数值算例发现,在减排效益分享型合同中,当制造商单独持股节能服务公司时,增加持股比例会使产品减排量和链条上其他成员利润增加,同时低碳产品市场价格增加;当零售商和制造商同时持股节能服务公司时,两公司增加持股比例同样会使企业决策和利润得到优化,实现真正意义上的供应链企业大联盟,但该种情形会加大持股比例与企业决策和利润的协调难度。此外,在减排效益分享型合同下,制造商对节能服务公司持股可使环保红利和企业效益均得到增加,建议此种减排模式下的供应链企业实施持股策略;但对于减排量保证型合同,持股策略对各企业决策及利润并无明显改善,因此该种减排合同下不建议企业间采取股权合作策略。

The impact of vertical shareholding among enterprises on supply chain decisions under different emission reduction contracts

With the full launch of China’s carbon trading market,high energy consumption and high carbon emission enterprises will be gradually incorporated into the carbon emission market system.In reality,most manufacturing companies do not have the ability to reduce emissions due to bottlenecks such as industry barriers and capital shortages.Therefore,reducing carbon emissions by professional Energy Service Companies(ESCOs)with“third party”attributes has become the best choice for these companies who do not have the ability to reduce emissions themselves.In energy conservation and emission reduction projects,emission reduction equipment and technology are funded by ESCOs(most ESCOs raise funds through financing).But they often have difficulties in financing and returning funds,resulting in shortage of funds,which will severely hinder the further expansion of the scale of development.In addition,the lack of trust between an ESCO and his user also affects the long-term cooperation between the two companies.Therefore,how to reduce the cost of abatement,increase the emission reduction,enhance the inter-enterprise robustness,and improve the overall competitiveness of supply chain enterprises in green development has become a realistic problem facing the Chinese government and enterprises.In view of the difficulties in financing,repayment and distrust with customers of ESCOs,this paper introduces the vertical shareholding strategy among enterprises.Combining the emission reduction benefit sharing contract and emission reduction guarantee contract adopted by manufacturers and ESCOs,the game theory and operation optimization methods are used to construct the models of the manufacturer holding shares in the ESCO under the two kinds of contracts mentioned above,respectively.The detailed process is as follows.Under the carbon trading policy and the low carbon preference of consumers,firstly,considering the case of adopting emission reduction benefit sharing contract among enterprises,the models of the ESCO with manufacturer’s sole ownership,manufacturer’s and retailer’s simultaneous ownership are constructed respectively,and the optimal decision-making of the corresponding models is solved.Subsequently,the influence of the shareholding strategy on the decision-making and profit of supply chain enterprises under the emission reduction contract is analyzed,and the advantages and disadvantages of the two shareholding methods are compared.Secondly,considering the case of adopting emission reduction guarantee contract between enterprises,we construct and solve the model of the manufacturer’s individual shareholding the ESCO,and obtain the decision values under three situations of actual emission reduction greater than,equal to,and less than the guaranteed emission reduction.Hereafter,the impact of the shareholding strategy under the emission reduction contract on the decision-making and profits of the supply chain is analyzed.In order to get some valuable conclusions,this paper analyzes the model through examples and numerical analysis,focusing on the relationship between shareholding ratio and corporate decision-making and profit.The results show that in the emission reduction benefit sharing contract,when the manufacturer separately holds the shareholding of the ESCO,the increase in the shareholding ratio of the manufacturer will increase the product emission reduction and the profits of other companies in the supply chain,and the product market price will also increase.Similarly,in the emission reduction benefit sharing contract,when the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously hold the ESCO,the increase in the shareholding ratios of the two companies also optimizes the decision-making and profit of each enterprise and realizes the true alliance among supply chain enterprises.However,this kind of shareholding model increases the difficulty of coordination between shareholding ratios and enterprise decision-making.In addition,in the emission reduction benefit sharing contract,the manufacturer’s shareholding in the ESCO can increase the environmental dividend and enterprise benefits.However,for emission reduction guarantee contract,the shareholding strategy does not significantly improve the decision-making and profits of enterprises in the supply chain.Therefore,it is recommended that supply chain enterprises adopting emission reduction benefit sharing contract implement shareholding strategy,while those who adopt emission reduction guarantee contract do not recommend implementation of this strategy.This paper aims to explore the impact of shareholding strategies on the decision-making and profits of low-carbon supply chain companies,and to analyze the applicability of share-holding strategy to enterprises who adopt different emission reduction contracts.