基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究

本文研究代理人过度自信条件下的委托-代理关系以及过度自信对委托-代理关系的作用机理.研究结果表明,当代理人的效益工资和委托人的监督成本都不为0时,代理人的最优努力水平将随着其过度自信程度的增大而提高,委托人的最优监督力度将随着代理人过度自信程度的增大而减弱;当代理人没有效益工资时,代理人的过度自信在委托-代理关系中不发挥作用.另外,代理人的最优努力水平和委托人的最优监督力度都将随着委托人监督成本的增大而降低,而且前者还将总是随着代理人固定报酬和效益工资的增加而提高,后者虽然也将随着代理人固定报酬的增加而提高,但并不总是随着代理人效益工资的增加而加强.

Research on Principal-Agent Model Based on Overconfident Agent

This paper researches principal-agent theory in the presence of overconfident agent and mechanism of overconfidence affecting on principal-agent theory.The result shows that when active wage of agent and monitoring cost of principal are not zero,the optimal level of effort exerted by agent in equilibrium would always increase in the overconfident level of agent and the optimal intensity of monitoring of principal in equilibrium would always decrease in the overconfident level of agent,and when active wage of agent is zero,the overconfident level of agent would not affect principal-agent relation.In addition,the optimal level of effort exerted by agent and the optimal intensity of monitoring of principal in equilibrium would decrease in the monitoring cost of principal,and the former would increase in fix wage and active wage of agent,and the latter would increase in fix wage of agent,but not always increase in active wage of agent.