| 控股股东代理的激励与侵占效应分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 宋小保,刘星,陈其安.控股股东代理的激励与侵占效应分析[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(1):53-58. |
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| 作者姓名： | 宋小保 刘星 陈其安 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 汕头大学商学院,广东汕头,515063;重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 控股股东与中小股东、债权人的代理冲突已经成为公司治理中代理问题的核心,而且也有相关文献实证分析了控股股东对企业绩效和企业价值的影响,但精确的定量理论分析仍较为缺乏.本文通过建立实物期权模型,理论研究了控股股东代理对企业投资政策选择和企业价值的影响.研究结果表明,随着控股股东现金流权的增加,企业价值增加,证明了控股股东存在正向的激励效应;随着控殷股东控制权和现金流权分离程度的加大.企业价值迅速降低,投资提前,该结论证明了控股股东具有负的侵占效应.
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| 关 键 词： | 控股股东 激励效应 侵占效应 实物期权 |
Controlling Shareholders Agency: Analysis of Incentive and Entrenchment Effects |
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| SONG Xiao-bao,LIU Xing,CHEN Qi-an.Controlling Shareholders Agency: Analysis of Incentive and Entrenchment Effects[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2009,23(1):53-58. |
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| Authors: | SONG Xiao-bao LIU Xing CHEN Qi-an |
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| Institution: | 1;2;1.Business School;Shantou University;Shantou 515063;China;2.Collage of Economics and Business Administration;Chongqing University;Chongqing 400030;China |
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| Abstract: | The agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and creditors has been becoming the core of agency problems in corporate governance.The effects of controlling shareholders on corporate valuation have been researched empirically in some papers,but the quantitative theoretic analysis is scarce yet.Real options model of investment is built in this paper,through which the effect of controlling shareholders on investment policy and corporate valuation was analyzed.Analysis result s... |
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| Keywords: | controlling shareholders incentive effect entrenchment effect real options |
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