考虑资金收益情况下的供应链回购契约

在制造商的资金收益率大于零售商资金收益率的情况下,以报童模型为基础,研究了资金收益对回购契约的影响.系统预期利润变为与批发价相关,利用拉格朗日方程求解了满足零售商参与约束、同时使系统和制造商预期利润取得最大值的契约参数.与不考虑资金收益情况下的供应链协调不同的是:订货批量大于相应批发价下不考虑零售商参与约束的最优订货批量；若零售商的保留利润一定,则回购价增大;回购价可以大于批发价,批发价可以小于制造商的边际生产成本.

The Supply Chain's Buy-back Contract Considering Capital Earning

The earning and cost of capital are often considered when the firms make their operation decisions.However,these factors are often not considered when studying supply chain contracts based on the newsvendor model.The capital earning rates of firms are different in selling cycles even though these rates are stable over a long period of time.For example,a manufacturer’s capital earning rate is high when it urgently needs capital.This paper studies the influence of capital earning on supply chain contracts by discussing buy-back contracts. This paper first investigates expected profit models for manufacturer,retailer,and supply chain system.The whole expected profit of the supply chain is not connected with the endogenetic wholesale price p and buy-back price b when the capital earning is not considered.Therefore,there is an optimal order quantity defined by the system exogenous variables.The supply chain is coordinated if the order quantity of the retailer is equal to that of the optimal order quantity of the supply chain system.However,the whole expected profit of the supply chain is connected with the wholesale price if the capital earning is considered and the manufacturer’s capital earning rate is not equal to that of a retailer.The optimal order quantity of the system is also connected with the wholesale price. In the next part of this paper,the transaction process between manufacturer and retailer is treated as a Stackelberg game.A manufacturer is the leader and decides on the contract parameters {w,b} at first.As the follower,a retailer decides the order quantity q which is based on the {w,b}.The optimal order quantity of a retailer is fixed under the certain variables {w,b}.If a manufacturer’s capital earning rate is more than that of its retailer,the retailer’s expected profit is equal to its reserved profit when the expected profits of the system and the manufacturer are optimal.So,the optimal {w,b} of the supply chain and the manufacturer which meet the retailer’s joining constraint can be acquired by solving the Lagrange equations if the information is symmetrical and the retailer’s reserved profit is known by the manufacturer. We further discuss these research models.Research shows that the expected profit of the system with buy-back contract is more than the expected profit without buy-back contract if the manufacturer’s capital earning rate is more than its retailer’s.The system can achieve the Pareto optimum when a supply chain system’s contract parameters {w,b} are optimal,and a manufacturer meets its retailer’s joining constraint.Therefore,buy-back contract can help coordinate the supply chain operation.When the supply chain is coordinated,there are some differences between the parameters of buy-back contract regardless of considering the capital earning.This study has three major findings.The first finding is that because of the retailer’s joining constraint the optimal order quantity is more than the order quantity.This condition enables the system to achieve its most expected profit under the same wholesale price when the capital earning is considered.The second finding is that if the expected profits of the retailer are same the buy-back price increases when the capital earning is considered.The third finding is that the buy-back price may be more than the wholesale price,and the wholesale price may be less than the marginal cost of the manufacturer when the capital earning is considered.At last,we make conclusions based on numerical analysis results.