高管股权激励与大股东掏空抑制研究:大股东异质特征和制度情境的调节效应

在引入合谋薪酬的委托代理模型中,探究高管股权激励对大股东掏空的作用机制,通过数值模拟与规范分析,从收入效应、风险效应以及身份转换效应三个层面阐释高管股权激励对大股东掏空的影响路径,并以我国沪深A股2009年至2013年实施股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用面板回归分析发现:高管股权激励存在抑制大股东掏空程度的作用;在股权集中度低、控股层级高和两权分离度大,以及市场化程度低、国有性质和集团控股的公司中,高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用显著,成为有助于投资者保护的内部治理机制;准自然实验的PSM-DID方法稳健性检验也支持了研究假设,并且高管股权激励对大股东掏空在滞后两年的抑制效应显著。研究揭示了高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用及情境差异,这为从公司内外部治理机制提出抑制大股东掏空的政策提供了启示。

Study on executive stock incentive and major shareholder tunneling restrain:Moderating effect of major shareholder heterogeneity and institutional contexts

As one of the prominent characteristics of emerging capital markets,large shareholder tunneling,represented by capital occupation,debt guarantee,and interest transmission,still exists in large numbers in listed companies in China.How to restrain the tunneling of large shareholders has become an urgent problem to be solved.When large shareholder tunneling reduces the value of the company,executive equity incentives designed to increase the value of the company exacerbate the conflict.Whether this will lead to a change in the role of managers from"collusion"to"gatekeeper"will be an attractive exploration.This paper reveals the interaction between large shareholders and managers using the principal-agent model.After adopting the path of the influence of executive equity incentive on the emptying of large shareholders,panel regression is used to prove the existence of the influence relationship and its channel effect.Using the quasi-natural experiment PSM-DID identification strategy to reduce the endogenous impact,reveal the relationship between executive equity incentive and large shareholder inhibition,this study finds out that conflicts of interest lead to the instability of collusion relationship.First of all,in the principal-agent model of collusive compensation,this paper explores the mechanism of executive equity incentive acting on the emptying of large shareholders.Through numerical simulation and normative analysis,this paper explains the mechanism of executive equity incentive acting on large shareholder tunneling from three aspects:income effect,risk effect,and identity conversion effect.The paper points out that the degree of large shareholder tunneling has been significantly reduced after the implementation of executive equity incentive plan.The higher the proportion of executive ownership is,the lower the degree of tunneling will be.The incentive of executive equity to restrain large shareholder tunneling mainly plays a role in the companies with strong tunneling motivation and favorable tunneling environment.Secondly,taking the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares that implemented the equity incentive plan from 2009 to 2013 as the research object.Based on the fixed effect regression model,this paper empirically examines the influence of executive equity incentives on large shareholder tunneling and examines the heterogeneity characteristics of large shareholders and the regulatory effect of external governance mechanism.The empirical results show that executive equity incentives can restrain the degree of tunneling of large shareholders.As a result of the equity incentive,executive stock ownership can also play a restraining role,but executive cash compensation has no obvious effect.In the motivation of tunneling,the more complex the pyramid control structure,the higher the shareholding ratio of large shareholders,the higher the degree of separation of ownership and control,the more obvious the inhibition effect of equity incentive on tunneling.In the context of tunneling,the degree of marketization of the location of the company is low,state-owned holding companies,group holding companies,equity incentive has a more obvious inhibition effect on large shareholders tunneling.Finally,to overcome the deviation of the estimation coefficient caused by endogeneity,the identification strategy of quasi-natural experiments based on the Difference-In-Differences method(DID)is proposed.To obtain a clean sample of the executive equity incentive effect,128 experimental companies were determined.Considering the lag of the executive equity incentive effect,the observation range includes 2008-2015.According to the corporate characteristic factors that affect the executive equity incentive,PSM is used to construct the group of the company(Control group)that has not implemented the executive equity incentive,and this method is used to match the sample of the company group(Treated group).Through the construction of the DID model,measuring the net effect of executive equity incentive before and after tunneling for 1 and 2 years,and using self-help(bootstrap)standard control error.It is found that executive equity incentive inhibits major shareholders from tunneling,resulting in a net reduction effect of 0.578%in one year and 0.869%in two years,and the effect of the two years is more significant.To sum up,this study helps identify the relationship between executives and major shareholders and needs to be summed up by executives and large shareholders.This study helps to identify the relationship between executives and major shareholders.It is necessary to construct a check and balance mechanism to prevent large shareholders from the cooperation and restriction relationship between executives and major shareholders.This study improves the external governance mechanism and other aspects to reduce the second category of agency costs.