| 基于海洋博弈的大股东制衡与合谋研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 安灵,刘星,白艺昕.基于海洋博弈的大股东制衡与合谋研究[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(3):100-105. |
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| 作者姓名： | 安灵 刘星 白艺昕 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
2. 西南大学数学与统计学院,重庆,400715 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于海洋博弈模型,对上市公司大股东的合谋及制衡进行研究.研究表明:大股东合谋行为是大股东竞争性内在选择的均衡结果,受到参与合谋的股东数量以及股东性质的影响,投票权越小,包含股东数越少的股东联盟越具有稳定性,部分大股东的合谋行为将会降低其他大股东的控制权收益,但对小股东的影响却是不确定的;同时,大股东的投票权差异越小,小股东的博弈收益越高,说明股权制衡有益于小股东的保护.
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| 关 键 词： | 海洋博弈 合谋 股权制衡 投资者保护 |
A Study of Power Balance and Collusion in Major Shareholders Based on Oceanic Games |
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| An Ling,Liu Xing,Bai Yi-xin.A Study of Power Balance and Collusion in Major Shareholders Based on Oceanic Games[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2008,22(3):100-105. |
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| Authors: | An Ling Liu Xing Bai Yi-xin |
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| Institution: | An Ling~1,Liu Xing~1,Bai Yi-xin~2(1/ College of Economics , Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China,2.College of Mathematics , Statistics,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on oceanic games,we analysis the mechanism of power balance and collusion effect in major shareholders in public listed firms.It is found that collusion is affected by the identities and numbers of major shareholders,a bloc with the smaller voting right and fewer shareholders will be more stable,which decreases the value of other major shareholders who are not in the bloc,whereas its influence on the value of minor shareholders is uncertain.The power of minor shareholders will be higher if the differe... |
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| Keywords: | Oceanic Games Collusion Power Balance Investor Protection |
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