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机构投资者持股与企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理行为选择
引用本文:袁知柱,王泽燊,郝文瀚.机构投资者持股与企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理行为选择[J].管理科学,2014,27(5):104-119.
作者姓名:袁知柱  王泽燊  郝文瀚
作者单位:东北大学 工商管理学院,沈阳,110004
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71202153);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(N110406010);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC630364);中国博士后科学基金(20110491501,2013T60297);国家级大学生创新创业训练计划项目
摘    要:采用异常操控性项目的计算方法度量企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理程度,以2003年至2011年中国上市公司为研究样本,构建多元线性回归模型和联立方程模型,考察机构投资者持股对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理行为选择的影响。研究结果表明,机构投资者持股比例与真实盈余管理程度显著负相关,与应计盈余管理程度显著正相关;对机构投资者明细类别的检验结果发现这种相关关系在投资基金、证券公司、QFII、保险公司和社保基金这5类机构投资者中均存在,但企业年金、信托公司、财务公司和银行持股对盈余管理行为的影响不显著;按照机构投资者持股规模、股权分置改革和终极控制人性质的分组检验结果表明,这种相关关系在不同的内外部环境中均存在,且相对于国有控股上市公司,非国有控股上市公司中机构投资者抑制真实盈余管理行为的作用更强;机构投资者持股与整体盈余管理程度显著负相关。

关 键 词:机构投资者持股  真实盈余管理  应计盈余管理  替代关系
收稿时间:2014/1/2 0:00:00
修稿时间:2014/7/9 0:00:00

Institutional Ownership and the Choice between Accrual and Real Earnings Management Activities
Yuan Zhizhu,Wang Zeshen and Hao Wenhan.Institutional Ownership and the Choice between Accrual and Real Earnings Management Activities[J].Management Sciences in China,2014,27(5):104-119.
Authors:Yuan Zhizhu  Wang Zeshen and Hao Wenhan
Institution:School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China,School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China,School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
Abstract:Taking the methods of abnormal manipulation terms to measure corporate accrual and real earnings management respectively, this study constructs multiple linear regression model and simultaneous equation model to examine the influence of institutional ownership on the choice between accrual earnings management and real earnings management activities with Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2011 as samples. The empirical results show that: institutional ownership is significantly and negatively correlated with real earnings management and positively and correlated with accrual earnings management. Details test according to the types of institutional investors finds that the relationship exists when the institutional investors are investment funds, securities companies, QFII, insurance companies and pension funds, but not for the enterprise annuity, trust companies, finance companies and banks. The sub-sample test results according to the scale of institutional ownership, split-share status reform and property of the ultimate controller find that the relationship exists in different internal and external environments. In addition, compared to the state-controlled listed companies, the inhibiting effect of institutional investors on real earnings management activities is stronger in non-state-owned listed companies. The final analysis finds that institutional ownership has a significantly negative correlation with overall earnings management.
Keywords:institutional ownership  real earnings management  accrual earnings management  substitution relationship
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