信息披露的作用 ——来自拍拍贷的经验证据

  信息披露对于降低信息不对称、减少市场的非效率的作用已经得到广泛的认可。因为中国依然缺乏完善的征信体系，P2P市场上也存在着更严重的信息不对称，所以信息披露在P2P借贷市场中发挥着更为重要的作用，值得学界和业界更深入的研究。         基于拍拍贷的数据，对信息披露在P2P市场上的作用进行研究。为了比较可验证的和不可验证的标准信息披露的不同作用，选择Logistic和Tobit等不同的回归模型以及不同的模型设置，实证检验其对于是否借款成功、是否违约、内部收益率的影响以及与借款利率之间的关系。         研究结果表明，信息披露对借款成功有正向影响，可验证的标准信息披露影响更大；信息披露具有的可验证性对借款成功有正向影响。同时，信息披露多的借款者更愿意提高借款利率，表明他们可能具有更低的信用。信息披露并不总是降低违约风险，部分信息及其可验证性反而导致更高的违约率。为了得到更可靠的结果，进一步对信息披露和内部收益率进行研究，结果同样表明，部分信息披露及其可验证性会带来更低的内部收益率。在稳健性检验中，上述结论依然不变。         研究结果丰富了信息披露、信息经济学、行为经济的研究内容，有利于平台设计更好的信息披露机制，即应控制披露信息条目，只披露能反映风险的信息，从而减少信息不对称，降低由投资人决策偏差导致的损失。同时，也为监管部门制定监管条例去纠正市场偏差和保护投资者权益提供了实证依据。

Role of Information Disclosure: The Case of PPDai.com

  The role of information disclosures in reducing information asymmetry and attenuating inefficiencies in financial market has been widely accepted. Given that there are no well-established credit rating agencies in China, the role of information disclosure is of greater significance in the peer-to-peer lending market, more research is needed to examine the role of information disclosure.         Using a comprehensive dataset of PPDai.com, we verified the role of information disclosure in the P2P lending market. Furthermore, to demonstrate the distinct economically effects between the unverifiable and verifiable information disclosures, regression models such as Logistic and Tobit models and different model specifications are employed to investigate the influence of information disclosure on successful funding, the probability of default, the internal return rate, and the relationship with the interest rate of the loan listings as well.         The results of the empirical study show that information disclosures have a positive effect on the successful funding, and verifiable information disclosures have a more significant impact. The verifiability of the information disclosure always has a positive influence. Meanwhile, the borrowers disclosing more information are more likely to raise the interest rate of the loan listings, which manifests that borrowers disclosing more information are more likely of worse credit. Consequently, the information disclosures do not effectively reduce the risk of default, and some information disclosures and their verifiability are even accompanied by higher rate of default. To concrete this result, Tobit regression model is employed to examine the relationship between information disclosures and the internal rate of return, and part of information disclosures and their verifiability also have a negative effect on the internal rate of return. Finally, alternative models were choosen to verify the robustness of the empirical results, and these conclusions still hold.         This paper contributes to the literature of information disclosures, information economics and behavioral economics. Our results will benefit the design of a better information disclosure mechanism, and the platform should control the information disclosure items by only disclosuring the information which reflects the default risk of the borrowers to reduce the information asymmetry and alleviate the investment loss resulting from decision biases. And our study also provides empirical basis for regulators enacting regulations to correcting market biases and protecting the benefits of the investors.