环境行政处罚能以儆效尤吗?——同伴影响视角下环境规制的威慑效应研究

环境规制是促进企业实施环境保护策略的主要推动力，本文应用犯罪经济学中的威慑理论，分析环境规制发挥治理作用的内在机理，实证研究目标企业环境行政处罚对同伴企业环保投资的影响，验证了环境规制发挥威慑效应的重要途径:同伴影响.以上市公司为样本，结合手工收集的2007年～2015年间企业环境行政处罚数据，实证结果显示:目标企业环境行政处罚增加了同伴企业的环保投资，即通过同伴影响路径，环境规制产生威慑效应.此外，企业规模、处罚性质以及媒体报道等因素影响环境规制的威慑效应，具体体现为被处罚企业规模大、处罚严厉以及媒体报道，对同伴企业的威慑效应更强;行业竞争作为一种外部机制，有助于强化环境规制的威慑效应.研究结论表明政府实施环境规制中提高处罚确定性、典型性、严厉性，以及舆论监督与行业竞争能够增强同伴影响，提高环境规制威慑力.

Can the penalty for environmental violation act as a deterrent to peers?: The evidence from the peer effect of environmental regulation

Environmental regulation is a main driver for corporate environment strategies. Applying the deterrence theory,the mechanic of how environmental regulation plays its governance role is analyzed,and the important channel of peer effect for the deterrence of environmental regulation is testified empirically. The empirical results,derived by using the data of listed companies in 2007-2015 and adopting the Heckman model,show that government environmental regulation has adeterrent effect of increasing the environmental protection investment of the peer firms. Firm size,severity of penalty,and media reportall affect the deterrence effect of environmental regulation: the larger the penalized firm,the more severe the punishment and the larger the effect of media report,the stronger the deterrence effect on peer firms. The industrial competition can strengthen the deterrence effect. Therefore,it can be concluded that by improving the certainty,typicality and strictness of punishments,with the media coverage and competition,the deterrence of environmental regulation can be strengthened.