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大股东治理及股东之间的代理问题研究综述
引用本文:张光荣,曾勇,邓建平.大股东治理及股东之间的代理问题研究综述[J].管理学报,2007,4(3):363-372,378.
作者姓名:张光荣  曾勇  邓建平
作者单位:电子科技大学管理学院
基金项目:教育部跨世纪优秀人才培养计划
摘    要:大股东在公司治理中扮演着重要的角色。大股东的出现可以解决股东分散带来的搭便车问题,减少股东与管理者之间的代理成本,但同时,大股东的出现又带来了另一个代理问题:大股东与小股东之间的代理问题。从股权集中的现状、大股东出现的原因、大股东对公司的影响、大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突等方面,对近年来有关大股东治理和大股东与小股东之间代理问题的研究文献进行了综述,并对这一领域内基于我国上市公司的相关研究成果进行了回顾。

关 键 词:公司治理  代理问题  大股东  股权集中  隧道行为  综述
文章编号:1672-884X(2007)03-0363-10
修稿时间:2006年4月25日

Review of Large Shareholder Governance and the Agency between Large and Minority Shareholders
ZHANG Guangrong,ZENG Yong,DENG Jianping.Review of Large Shareholder Governance and the Agency between Large and Minority Shareholders[J].Chinese JOurnal of Management,2007,4(3):363-372,378.
Authors:ZHANG Guangrong  ZENG Yong  DENG Jianping
Abstract:Large shareholder plays an important role in corporate governance.The emergence of large shareholder reduces the cost agency between the shareholder and manager because of solving the free-riding caused by dispersed ownership structure.But it gives birth to another agency problem between large and minority shareholders.Reviewed were recent literatures on large shareholder governance and agency problem between large and minority shareholders from the angle of the condition of ownership concentration,large shareholder's motivation,large shareholder's effect on the company and the interest conflict between large and minority shareholders.The agency problem in Chinese companies was also analyzed.
Keywords:corporate governance  agency  large shareholder  ownership concentration  tunneling  overview
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