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食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计
引用本文:张春勋,刘伟,李录青.食品供应链中企业与农户短期合作交易契约设计[J].管理学报,2010,7(2):243-247,288.
作者姓名:张春勋  刘伟  李录青
作者单位:1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆工商大学经济贸易学院
2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院
3. 重庆工商大学经济贸易学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金,科技部国家软科学项目 
摘    要:依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性,在不完全契约理论框架下,建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明,企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型,从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键,子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为,企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。

关 键 词:不完全契约  机制设计  分离均衡  混同均衡

The Design of Incomplete Transaction Contract between Meatpacking Enterprises & Farmers in the Food Supply Chain
ZHANG Chunxun,LIU Wei,LI Luqing.The Design of Incomplete Transaction Contract between Meatpacking Enterprises & Farmers in the Food Supply Chain[J].Chinese JOurnal of Management,2010,7(2):243-247,288.
Authors:ZHANG Chunxun  LIU Wei  LI Luqing
Abstract:Based on the transaction characteristics between the meatpacking enterprise and farmer in the food supply chain and the incomplete contract theory, the paper constitutes the short-term cooperate transaction contraction model with the hypothesis that the both parties promise not to renegotiate. The conclusions show that the status of enterprises as test-agents is crucial to ensure the farmer to declare his type honestly in order to guarantee the special investment of both the parties optimized, and the limitation of the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium is that the payment function of enterprise must be a monotonous one so that the enterprise can tell the truth.
Keywords:incomplete contract  mechanism design  separating equilibrium  pooling equilibrium
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