风险偏好信息非对称下的供应链寄存契约研究

分析了寄存契约下,供应商损失规避程度对供应商生产量及供应链中成员利润的影响,进一步考虑损失规避信息为对称和非对称情况下,损失规避程度对供应链中成员利润的影响,以及对零售商而言风险态度信息的价值。研究发现,供应链中成员利润为损失规避程度的减函数,信息对称情况下供应链中成员利润要优于非对称信息情况下。最后,基于信号博弈探讨供应商风险偏好信息的揭示机制,证明信号博弈的分离均衡和混同均衡的存在,为供应商的决策提供了科学的指导。

Supply Chain Consignment Contract in Context of Asymmetric Risk Preference Information

The influence of the loss aversion is discussed on the suppliers' production quantity and the players' profits in the consignment contract.Furthermore,the players' profits are analyzed considering the supplier's loss aversion in the two situations: symmetric risk preference information and asymmetric risk preference information.It shows that the player's profits are decreasing with the loss aversion level and the players' profits in the symmetric information are higher than that in asymmetric information.Th...