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股权结构、财务困境成本与困境公司绩效
引用本文:廖冠民,卢闯,陈勇.股权结构、财务困境成本与困境公司绩效[J].南开管理评论,2006,9(6):68-73.
作者姓名:廖冠民  卢闯  陈勇
作者单位:1. 中国人民大学商学院会计系
2. 中国人民大学商学院财务金融系
3. 中国人民大学经济学院
摘    要:本文以1997—2003年发生财务困境的105家上市公司为研究样本,以资本支出率度量公司投资水平,以销售增长率与“EBIT/总资产”度量公司绩效,采用单变量与多变量分析方法。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例越大,困境公司的投资与绩效水平越高;股权制衡对困境公司不再具有显著的积极作用;由于预算软约束的存在,国有公司比非国有公司在财务困境期间具有更低的财务困境成本,失去了更少的投资机会、市场份额与利润,从而表现出更高的投资与绩效水平;公司是否被企业集团控制与财务困境成本及困境公司的投资、绩效水平没有显著相关性。

关 键 词:股权结构  财务困境  财务困境成本  公司绩效

Ownership Structure, Costs of Financial Distress and the Performance of Corporations in Distress
Liao Guanmin,Lu Chuang,Chen Yong.Ownership Structure, Costs of Financial Distress and the Performance of Corporations in Distress[J].Nankai Business Review,2006,9(6):68-73.
Authors:Liao Guanmin  Lu Chuang  Chen Yong
Institution:Liao Guanmin Lu Chuang Chen Yong
Abstract:The author uses Chinese listed companies in financial dis- tress from 1997 to 2003 as sample,and measures the level of corpo- rate investment with the ratio of capital expenditure,and the level of corporate performance with the rate of sales growth and the ratio of EBIT to total asset.In terms of univariate and multivariate analyses, the paper finds that the corporations in distress with more shares of the top shareholder have higher level of investment and performance; balance among large shareholders has no significant impact on cor- porations in distress;due to soft budget constraints,SOEs' costs of financial distress is lower than that of non-SOEs,and then have the higher level of investment and the better performance;but whether the corporations in distress belong to a group does not correlate with its investment and performance significantly.
Keywords:Ownership Structure  Financial Distress  Costs of Financial Distress  Corporate Performance
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