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股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据
引用本文:李维安,李汉军.股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2006,9(5):4-10.
作者姓名:李维安  李汉军
作者单位:1. 南开大学商学院
2. 中央财经大学
基金项目:教育部哲学社会科学重大项目攻关项目;面向21世纪教育振兴行动计划(985计划);天津市社会科学基金
摘    要:本文以1999年至2003年的民营上市公司为研究对象,回避国有上市公司的非市场因素,研究股权结构、高管持股对绩效的影响。实证研究显示:第一大股东绝对控股时,其持股比例越高公司绩效越好,这时高管的股权激励无法发挥作用;当第一大股东持股比例低于20%时,高管的股权激励也无法发挥作用;当第一大股东持股比例在20%至40%之间时,其持股比例和绩效呈现倒U型关系,这时高管的股权激励发挥显著的作用。不同的股权结构对股权激励和绩效产生不同的影响,设计公司治理机制时应充分考虑这一因素。

关 键 词:股权结构  高管持股  绩效  民营上市公司

Ownership Structure, Executive Ownership and Performance: Evidence from Private Listed Firms in China
Li Wei'an,Li Hanjun.Ownership Structure, Executive Ownership and Performance: Evidence from Private Listed Firms in China[J].Nankai Business Review,2006,9(5):4-10.
Authors:Li Wei'an  Li Hanjun
Abstract:This study examines the relationship between ownership structure, executive ownership and performance by researching into private listed firms from 1999 to 2003 in China.The empirical results suggest that there is no a linear relationship between the stake of the largest shareholder and the firm's performance. When the stake of the largest shareholder is low, the negative relationship exists and ownership incentive is not effective. When the stake of the largest shareholder is so high as to control the firm, the positive relationship exhibits and ownership incentive is not effective too. If the stake of the largest shareholder lies between 20 percent and 40 percent of total share, there is a reverse U relationship between them and ownership incentive effects.
Keywords:Ownership Structure  Executive Incentive  Performance  Private Listed Companies
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