股权比例、大股东"掏空"策略与全流通

本文从股票价值的现金股利模型和Ohlson模型出发,得出非流通股价值基本上由现金股利或非法侵占所决定的结论.非流通股股东实现其股权价值最大化的途径有两个派发现金股利和侵占公司资源.单方和多方博弈的结果表明,控股股东持有的股份比例越高,侵占公司资源的可能性越低;在大股东数量少、第一大股东持股比例较低的情况下,大股东可能会合谋侵占公司资源,导致上市公司资源被侵占的程度增大;随着大股东数量的增多,上市公司资源被侵占的可能性和程度都会降低;在股权极其分散(全流通)的条件下,大股东仍有极大的动机侵占上市公司资源,经验结果支持以上的推论.

Share-holding Ratio, Tunneling Strategy and Totally Circulating

Based on PVED and Ohlson(1995) model, this paper im- plies that the value of un-negotiable shares are almost decided by cash dividends and illegally getting resource from listed-firms. Un- like prior research, this paper use game theory to analyses when big shareholders predating resource from listed-firms and finds that the more shares the controlling shareholders held, the less possibility de- gree of predating resource from listed-firm; when the ratio of shares big shareholders occupied is median, the possibility of predating resource gets largest; when the amount of big shareholders become more, the possibility of predating resource getting smaller; and when the shareholders are very scattered, the big shareholder has strong motives to predate resource from the company. This conclusion was supported by empirical test.