首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

为什么CEO解职如此罕见? 一种基于前景理论的解释
引用本文:汪金爱,章凯,赵三英.为什么CEO解职如此罕见? 一种基于前景理论的解释[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):54-66.
作者姓名:汪金爱  章凯  赵三英
作者单位:1. 中欧国际工商学院
2. 中国人民大学商学院组织与人力资源系
3. 中国社会科学院研究生院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70972128)资助
摘    要:基于前景理论和公司行为理论,本研究将商业风险、所有权集中度及CEO解职后的继任来源整合于同一框架。基于中国上市公司数据所进行的大样本实证分析表明,商业风险、CEO与董事长兼任、所有权集中度与CEO解职率正相关,所有权集中度负向调节商业风险对CEO解职关系。但针对CEO解职后不同继任来源的分析显示,这种调节作用尽管在两类CEO解职中仍然得到保持,但其它所考察变量在外部继任型解职中则有着明显不同。这些发现,进一步加深了对高所有权集中度情境下,CEO解职这一极为重要的战略决策过程的理解。

关 键 词:CEO解职  前景理论  商业风险  所有权集中度

Why So Rare? An Explication of CEO Dismissal Based on Prospect Theory
Wang Jin'ai , Zhang Kai , Zhao Sanying.Why So Rare? An Explication of CEO Dismissal Based on Prospect Theory[J].Nankai Business Review,2012,15(1):54-66.
Authors:Wang Jin'ai  Zhang Kai  Zhao Sanying
Institution:1.China Europe International Business School;2.School of Business,Renmin University;3.Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Abstract:Replacing the underperforming CEO(Chief Executive Officer) remains one of the most important strategic choices that the board of directors has to take so as to render the firm more adaptive to the changing environment and viable for survival and success.Although firm performance is an important determinant,it explains less than half the variances of CEO dismissal.There is much room therefore,to explore CEO dismissal from other perspectives that might complement,or even offset,the performance driven explanation.The board,representing the broad interests of the owners,is necessarily embedded in the various formal and informal institutions that characterize the firm’s social behavioral context.We propose in this paper that it is of vital importance to examine the social behavioral factors involved in the board’s decision of CEO dismissal in addition to the typical economic concerns focusing on firm performance.Based on the Prospect Theory and behavioral theories of firms,we tentatively explore three basic issues concerning CEO dismissal by integrating business risk,ownership concentration and different sources of succession into one conceptual framework.Using a data set of 82 CEO dismissal events in 2,455 CEO turnovers of Chinese listed firms,applying different logistic and survival analysis methods,we find some robust results of CEO dismissal.From the empirical results of logistic regressions and survival analysis,we find business risk,CEO duality,and ownership concentrations are positively related to CEO dismissal;ownership concentration negatively moderated the effect of business risk.Although this moderating effect still held when the CEO dismissal is classified by succession types,most of the other study variables lose significance in the CEO dismissal followed by outside succession.Overall,these findings give us a better understanding of the role of business risk,risk preference,and ownership concentration in the specific strategic decision of CEO dismissal process;social behavioral perspectives are more effective in explaining CEO dismissal than simple economic concerns in the Chinese context.
Keywords:CEO Dismissal  Prospect Theory  Business Risk  Ownership Concentration
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号