电信网络互联互通利益分配模型及激励机制 |
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引用本文: | 孟庆国,陈剑.电信网络互联互通利益分配模型及激励机制[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(6):40-46. |
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作者姓名: | 孟庆国 陈剑 |
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作者单位: | 清华大学公共管理学院,北京,100084 |
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基金项目: | 面向21世纪教育振兴行动计划(985计划),00120815, |
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摘 要: | 通过建立数理模型对不同电信网络运营商之间互联互通后的利益分配进行计算,利用
博弈论分析了激励机制,认为竞争者与垄断者的网络规模比例、接入费政策、折现率和拒绝互
联的惩罚4 个因素直接影响互联互通的实现,综合调整4 种因素可以达到双赢的互联互通. 并
结合国内实际情况,给出了具体的政策建议.
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关 键 词: | 电信网络 互联互通 激励 竞争 |
文章编号: | 1007-9807(2003)06-0040-07 |
修稿时间: | 2002年2月1日 |
Model of interests allocation in telecom network interconnection and incentive
mechanism analysis |
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Abstract: | Analyzing the main factors of interconnection of telecom industry is the aim of this paper. A model is
built to calculate the benefit from interconnection distributing in different telecom firms , and analyzed the incentive
mechanism through game theory. It is concluded that the scale ratio between competitor and monopoly , policy of ac2
cess cost , discount rate and punish of refusing interconnection are the main factors affecting interconnection , and
adjusting these factors may get both-win interconnection. According to real condition in China , the paper give the
policy advice |
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Keywords: | telecom industry network interconnection incentive competition |
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