战略扩张与融资选择

结合信息经济学和代理成本理论的研究结论建立了一个公司扩张战略对融资契约影响 的模型. 研究结果显示公司横向一体化战略扩张所获得的剩余与债务比率正相关,但是如果公 司计划从纵向一体化中获得剩余,减少负债水平并增加专用性投资水平是理性选择. 而且模型 对公司融资契约的委托代理问题进行了分析,认为现金流对融资契约产生重要影响. 在此基础 上对模型的主要结论进行了实证检验,检验结果与主要研究结果相吻合. 最后,为公司战略扩 张和融资决策提供了若干建议.

Strategic expansion and choice of f inancing

A model is constructed to analysis the corporate strategic expansion which influences financial contract in which the agent cost and moral hazard were included. The conclusion is that the earnings of lateral integration is positive relative to the ratio of debt ; but if the shareholder want to get more earnings from vertical integration , they must decrease the ratio of debt and increase the level of relationship2specific investment . Secondly , we discussed the principle2agent and moral hazard of financial contract , in which disclose that cash flow is important for corporate financing. The emperical evidences in this paper coincide with the above theoretical conclusion. At last , we give some advice about strategic expansion and financing decision.