| 基于动态博弈的企业集团政策动态一致性分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 周晶, 盛昭瀚, 何建敏,.基于动态博弈的企业集团政策动态一致性分析[J].管理科学学报,2000,3(2):49-53. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周晶 盛昭瀚 何建敏 |
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| 作者单位： | 东南大学经济管理学院,南京,210096 |
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| 基金项目： | 中国科学院资助项目，79830010， |
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| 摘 要： | 运用动态博弈模型 ,以企业集团内部公共费用征收问题为背景 ,讨论了集团总部与成员企业之间的动态博弈 ,并对集团政策的动态一致性问题进行了研究分析 .最后 ,本文还给出了在集团非平均主义政策倾向下相应的动态博弈模型 ,以及动态一致性政策所满足的条件 .
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| 关 键 词： | 动态博弈模型 企业集团 动态一致性 |
The policy dynamic consistency based on dynamic game for enterprise group |
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| ZHOU Jing,SHENG Zhao-han,HE Jian-min.The policy dynamic consistency based on dynamic game for enterprise group[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2000,3(2):49-53. |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Jing SHENG Zhao-han HE Jian-min |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,the dynamic game between member enterprises and the general headquarter within Enterprise Group is discussed in view of dynamic game theory. The policy dynamic consistency of the general headquarter is analyzed. The reason that causes the policy inconsistent is pointed out. Under the non-egalitarianism tendency of the general headquarter, the dynamic game model between member enterprises and the general headquarter is presented and the dynamic consistent conditions are also given. |
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| Keywords: | dynamic game model enterprise group policy dynamic consistency |
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