考虑需求异常扰动和管理者损失厌恶行为的能力结构投资模型

本文在需求异常扰动的情境下,研究了运作系统专有和柔性能力结构的投资决策模型,并在数理上证明和比较了管理者两种不同风险感知情况下的能力结构比率决策问题。研究表明:在需求异常扰动发生概率、扰动分布参数以及柔性扩张系数影响下,风险中性和存在损失厌恶行为的管理者在柔性能力投资决策上存在明显的差异,依据缺货损失程度采取的补贴或惩罚机制可以改善损失厌恶管理者的柔性能力投资决策偏差。

Investment Model of Capacity Structure with the Consideration of a Sudden Disturbed Demand and a Loss-Aversion Manager

Manager seldom shows completely rational when giving investment decision of a certain operation system. In this paper, two types of manger, who are risk-neutral and loss-aversion respectively when deciding an operation system's capacity structure which is a mixture of flexible and dedicated operational capacity are reinvestigated. Furthermore, the investment decision is considered when operation system might face an sudden fluctuated external demand, with a characteristic of drifting-upwards mean and extended/converged variance. A basic and extended newsvendor model is presented to compare the different decision of different managers mentioned above, and mathematic proofs are also presented as well. Results indicated that, under the influence of some critical parameters, which are the probability and distribution parameters of sudden disturbance on demand, the expansion ration of flexible capacity in different scenarios, the investment decision on flexible capacity make by a risk-neutral manager is rather different when compared to a loss-aversion one. Lastly, subsidy or penalty based on the amplitude of underage cost could mitigate the flexible capacity investment decision gap when manager present loss-aversion.