晋升激励、地域偏爱与企业环境表现:来自A股上市公司的经验证据

晋升激励和地域偏爱是影响地方政府官员决策行为的关键因素。本文以2009-2015年沪深A股上市企业为样本，探讨官员更替对企业环境表现的影响，并分别从晋升激励和地域偏爱两个角度切入分析这种影响背后的机制。研究发现，地方政府换届后，若继任官员来自本地调任，则当地企业的环境表现将得到改善；而若继任官员来自异地调任，则当地企业的环境表现将发生恶化。这一研究结论在解决可能的内生性问题、改变度量指标、考虑滞后反应、进行安慰剂测试、调整样本及控制其他可能的遗漏变量等一系列稳健性测试后仍然成立。进一步研究发现，异地调任的继任官员出于晋升激励的动机而倾向于降低地方环境治理水平；而本地调任官员出于对曾经任职地区的地域偏爱而更重视当地环境治理。本文创新性地从地方官员的晋升激励和地域偏爱视角探讨企业的环境社会责任，为理解地方官员的决策模式和企业环境责任行为提供了新思路。

Promotion Incentive,Regional Favoritism and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Listed Firms in China

Local government officials' behavior choices have been influenced by promotion incentive and their regional favoritism. Choosing the A-share listed companies in China during 2009 and 2015 as a study sample,the influence of local government transition on corporate environmental performance is empirically studied. Meanwhile the mechanism behind this association between local government transition and corporate environmental performance is analyzed from the perspectives of promotion incentive and regional favoritism. It is found that the corporate environmental performance would improve when the new official was from a same city. Meanwhile the corporate environmental performance would worsen when the new official was from a different city. These findings remain robust after a battery of robustness checks. After analyzing the effect mechanism, it is found that it mainly because of promotion incentive of the new official from a different city, and regional favoritism of the new official from a same city. Not only the research on the corporate environmental social responsibility from the perspectives of promotion incentive and regional favoritism of local government officials is enrichd, but also a new way to understand the decision-making model of local government officials and corporate governance from a larger picture is offered.