考虑零售商质量控制和风险规避的供应链网络均衡研究

研究零售商质量控制和供应链成员风险规避背景下供应链网络均衡问题。应用条件风险值度量风险规避程度，利用变分不等式理论描绘供应链参与者的最优经济行为，设计供应链网络均衡模型，考虑风险规避和质量控制策略对均衡的影响，证明均衡解存在且唯一，并运用Levenberg-Marquardt算法求解均衡模型。最后对重要参数进行数值分析，揭示质量控制和风险规避对供应链均衡解以及参与者条件风险值的影响。研究表明：供应链参与者越规避风险越有利于产品质量水平的提高，风险规避程度的加深会降低制造商或零售商自身的CVaR，同时增大对方的CVaR，对因产品合格率提高带来的利益而言，制造商所得优于零售商。

Study on Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Considering Quality Control by Retailer and Risk-aversion

Product quality is fundamental factor for supply chain to obtain a competitive advantage and to build stable supply chain relationship. Retailers are the link between manufacturers and consumers. The effective product quality control by retailers not only can encourage manufacturers to improve the quality of products but also can ensure the quality of products purchased by consumers. In reality, the supply chain network in which the competition and cooperation coexist is complex. The research on the equilibrium state of the supply chain network has become a hot topic in recent years. In addition, fierce competition brings more uncertainty to the market demand, and supply chain members will show the characteristics of risk aversion which could affect them in making quality decisions. Therefore, this paper attempts to find the supply chain network equilibrium under quality control by retailers with risk-averse manufacturers and risk-averse retailers.In order to control the product quality, the retailer inspects the product purchased from the manufacturer. If unqualified products are found, the retailer claims compensation from the manufacturer. Meanwhile, conditional Value-at-Risk is used to evaluate the risk aversion of manufacturers and retailers. The effect of risk aversion on the quality decision of supply chain members is considered. Firstly, under quality control, conditional Value-at-Risk model of manufacturers and retailers are established respectively. According to the principle of maximizing the conditional Value-at-Risk, the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers are solved. Secondly, The optimal economic behavior of players in the supply chain network is portrayed by way of variational inequalities theory and supply chain network equilibrium model is constructed. Then, the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results is provided. Finally, the Levenberg-Marquardt method is built to solve the equilibrium model. The impacts of the changes of the parameters in the model on the equilibrium solutions are presented through the sensitivity analysis of the parameters. Through the analysis, the impact of quality control and risk aversion on the solution of equilibrium model and player's conditional Value-at-Risk can be revealed.Several conclusions are drawn:first, with the risk aversion of manufacturers or retailers increasing, the product quality will improve and the manufacturers' conditional Value-at-Risk will increase more then retailers. In addition, if the risk aversion of manufacturers or retailers increases, their own conditional Value-at-Risk will reduce, and the manufacturers' conditional Value-at-Risk is very sensitive to changes in retailers' risk aversion. Further, the increase in the product qualification rate will increase the conditional risk value of both manufacturers and retailers. The manufacturers' benefits due to the increase in the qualification rate will be greater than those obtained by the retailers. Additionally when the manufacturers' qualification rate is too low, the retailers will refuse to order their products. Finally, increased selling price can promote the optimization of product quality.