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制造商相对弱势格局下“主制造商-供应商”双方叫价拍卖灰博弈模型
引用本文:王欢,方志耕.制造商相对弱势格局下“主制造商-供应商”双方叫价拍卖灰博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2019,27(6):103-112.
作者姓名:王欢  方志耕
作者单位:南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏 南京 210016
基金项目:江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX19_0143);南京航空航天大学博士生短期访学项目(190408DF09);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671091,71801127,71673119,71573120)
摘    要:高技术产品的研制初期,主制造商受系统集成能力弱、缺少市场话语权、与供应商合作关系不稳固等因素的影响,在项目谈判中往往处于弱势地位,尤其在产品定价问题上常常受到供应商的牵制。针对这一问题,引入体现主制造商和供应商定价博弈中贫信息及有限理性的灰系数,构建了"主制造商-供应商"双方叫价拍卖灰博弈模型,揭示价格谈判过程中的博弈关系,并对模型的交易范围进行了讨论;针对主制造商弱势格局下的博弈问题进行了参数设定和系统仿真,分析了主制造商的最优灰报价和可获得的最大效用;最后,根据模型及其仿真结果分别从前期沟通策略、价格谈判策略和长期合作策略的角度提出了主制造商博弈的策略建议。

关 键 词:“主制造商-供应商”  灰色博弈  双方叫价拍卖  有限理性  
收稿时间:2017-11-30
修稿时间:2018-04-09

Study on a “Main Manufacturer-Supplier” Bilateral Auction Grey Game Model Under the Background of Main Manufacturer Being at a Disadvantage
WANG Huan,FANG Zhi-geng.Study on a “Main Manufacturer-Supplier” Bilateral Auction Grey Game Model Under the Background of Main Manufacturer Being at a Disadvantage[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,27(6):103-112.
Authors:WANG Huan  FANG Zhi-geng
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Abstract:In the initial developing stage of some high-tech products, the main manufacturer is always in a disadvantaged position and passive in pricing negotiation because of the lack of systemic integration capability and market share, and its instable relationship with suppliers. The price negotiation problem between the main manufacturer and the supplier is a game problem based on each acceptable price. The final price has a lot to do with the pricing strategies of the two parties, this process can be simplified as a bilateral auction, which shows the feature of "small sample, poor information" and finite rationality of game players.In order to solve this problem, the grey coefficient is introduced to show the poor information and finite rationality in the pricing game between the main manufacturer and the supplier, and a "main manufacturer-supplier" bilateral auction grey game model is constructed. To reveal the game relationship in price negotiation, the equilibrium objective function, the equilibrium strategy condition, the optimal grey quotation, the transaction probability and the expected utility of both parties are analyzed. Then the transaction conditions and the scope of the grey game model are discussed. Through the analysis, it is found that the possible trading scope of the grey game model is larger than that in the classic model. It is known that the transaction loss area of the classic model is mainly due to incomplete information, however, in real transaction, the subjects can improve the transaction efficiency by collecting information and adjusting the game strategy to make part of the incomplete "black information" whitening.Finally, the parameter setting and system simulation are carried out for the game problem under the main manufacturer being at a disadvantage, the optimal grey price and the maximum utility of the main manufacturer are analyzed, and the strategy proposals of the main manufacturer in this game are put forward from the perspective of the early communication strategy, the price negotiation strategy and the long-term cooperation strategy. This study is a new exploration of grey game theory, and provides a scientific strategy support for the price negotiation of the main manufacturers.
Keywords:main manufacturer-supplier  grey game theory  bilateral auction  finite rationality  
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