考虑公众参与环境行为的公共健康两方博弈演化模型研究

公众参与环境行为是深化生态文明改革的重要组成部分，对化石能源消费排放引发的公共健康水平有着不可忽视的影响。将“公众参与”作为博弈模型的主要策略参数，“政府”与企业设为公共健康影响主要主体。运用演化博弈构建了公共健康影响主体交互机制博弈模型，基于复制动态方程原理与问卷调查数值仿真方法，详尽分析了公共健康主体各相关要素交互演化路径的变化快慢。研究结果表明：模型有{监管，不转型}，{监管，转型}两个演化稳定策略。公众参与环境治理程度以及公众自身健康关心度对企业能源转型和政府监管演化路径有显著正向影响，同时与“政府”和企业自身特征相关；公共健康损失赔偿大小是政府监管与企业实行能源转型的重要因素；政府监管知识掌握程度、能源政策执行力、企业能源转型成本大小及额外收益极大影响公共健康主体演化路径；学习型“政府”的监管更能有效加快企业能源转型。同时发现，只有各主体参数共同改变，其中公众参与环境行为群体达90%以上时，公共健康损失才会显著下降；单一主体不能有效作用于公共健康水平；目前，{政府不监管，实行能源转型}这一最理想演化博弈策略在我国国情下还未出现。本文为激发公众参与环境行为、助推企业能源转型与提升公共健康政策的制定提供了新的视角。

A Study on Evolution Game of Two sides with Public Health Considering Public Participation in Environmental Behavior as Major Parameter

Public participation in environmental behavior, which is an important part of the deepening reform of ecological civilization has a non-negligible impact on the level of public health caused by pollutants emissions from fossil fuels. Environmental pollution originates from fossil energy use in enterprises and lax government oversight, which damage to public health. An interactive model between the enterprise’s energy transformation and government regulation is built considering the public participation in environmental management skills, environmental knowledge mastery, and public own health concern using evolutionary theories in which the public is set a main strategy of parameters, and enterprise and governments are set as the two principal parts that influenced public health. It is followed by numerical simulation with a questionnaire and the replicator dynamic equation, analyzing the evolutionary process of the interactive behavior of enterprises and government with the software of Matlab, showing that the effect of each different parameter from a game subject on the strategy of evolutionary results. The model presents two evolutionarily stable strategies: one is a set of a strategy, regulation and non-transformation, another is regulation and transformation. It is found that the extent of environmental control and the degree of public health care affect the evolutionary path of the enterprise’s transformation and government regulation. Compensation for public health loss is an important factor of government strict regulation. The degree of mastering government regulation knowledge, implementation of energy policy, the cost of energy transformation and additional income are important factors of the enterprise’s energy transformation. Besides, the result of the research shows that public health losses are going to go down significantly only can be the parameters for each subject of the game changed together, moreover, public pro-environmental behavior reaches over 90%. A strategy change of a single subject couldn’t act on public health improvement. The ideal evolutionary strategy of {implementing energy transformation, government non-regulation} has not shown up yet in the current situation of China. It also can be found that the public participation in environmental behavior has a positive effect on energy transformation as long as the public participates in environmental governance, regardless of how much to participate in the extent of environmental behavior. This article provides a new perspective for stimulating public participation in environmental behaviors and promoting the formulation of corporate energy transition and public health promotion policies.