基于激励相容契约的ATO式供应链交叉协调研究

考虑由两个零部件供应商与单个制造商组成的按订单装配式供应链中的信息不对称问题。以完全信息下各成员的利润作为基准，分析了成本类型信息占优的单个供应商"信息伪装"对纵向制造商和横向互补供应商所造成的损失，提出了基于激励相容的供应商-制造商纵向契约和横向互补供应商参与下的交叉协调契约。通过数学建模和仿真数据分析，研究表明：制造商主导的针对单个信息不对称供应商的激励契约，会产生"低端向下扭曲"现象，降低了横向供应商的最优订单量；制造商与横向的信息对称供应商分担信息租金而形成的交叉协调，在显示真实成本信息的同时，还可以提高最优订单量和整个供应链的全局利润。

Research on Cross-Coordination of ATO Supply Chain under Incentive Compatibility Contract

Assemble-To-Order system as a vital strategy has been widely used by many manufacturing firms. A problem of asymmetric cost information is considered in assemble-to-order supply chain comprised of two component suppliers and single manufacturer. Based on the profiles of every members under complete information, the loss of vertical manufacturer and horizontal complementary supplier are analyzed due to "information disguise" from supplier who has private cost type information, and vertical supplier-manufacturer contract is presented based on incentive compatibility and cross-coordination contract with horizontal complementary supplier's participation. And the menu of contract is incentive feasible if it satisfies both incentive compatible and participation constraints.Through mathematical deduction and data analysis, using Excel VBA programming to simulate models and data example, the result shows that:(1)under complete information, manufacturer can occupy all profit of supply chain, upstream suppliers' reservation revenues are zero.(2)under asymmetric information of supplier's cost, single supplier's information disguise not only reduces vertical manufacturer's profit and horizontal complementary supplier's profit, but also is harm to global benefit of supply chain.(3) the vertical incentive contract which is offered by manufacturer to asymmetric information supplier, can reveal the true cost information of asymmetric information supplier, and increase expected profits of vertical manufacturer and complementary supplier. But that cause "low efficiency downward distortion" effect which decreases the horizontal supplier's optimal order quantity.(4) The cross-coordination of sharing information rent between manufacturer and horizontal symmetric information supplier can reveal true cost type information and increase optimal order quantity and global profile of whole supply chain.Above results fill the gap in the literature of ATO supply chain and incentive contract. And the managerial insight suggests that supplier need to cross-coordinate not only with vertical manufacturer, but also with horizontal complementary supplier.