双边市场中平台企业搭售行为分析

搭售是现实中双边平台企业常用的促销策略之一。通过构建一个两阶段完全信息动态博弈模型,将买方分为搭售喜好型和搭售无差异型,从垄断和竞争两种情形研究了双边平台企业采取搭售策略时,具有不同搭售偏好的买方对最优均衡解的影响以及相应的社会福利变化。研究发现:不论是垄断情形还是竞争情形,搭售对买卖双方均衡进入价格的影响都不确定,而搭售产品的定价则按照传统单边市场的定价方式制定;垄断情形下,搭售能增加买方数量、卖方数量及双边平台企业的利润,而竞争情形下,搭售产品成本较小的双边平台企业将获得较大买方数量、卖方数量及利润。在两种情形下的买方总效用、卖方总效用以及社会总福利均随搭售喜好型买方数量的增加而增加。

The Analysis of Tie-sale in Two-sided Markets

Tie-in sale is one of the most common promotion strategies of two sided platforms in real world. Separating buyers into two groups i.e.tying preference buyers and tying indifference buyers,the paper analyzes different tying preference that influences equilibrium pricing and relative social welfare,when two sided plat forms implement tying strategy as one of promotion strategies.The results show that tying has ambiguous effect on buyerentry equilibrium price and sellerentry equilibrium,which are set by two sided platforms in monopoly case and competition case.The price of tying productis set as single markets in both cases.In monopoly case,tying can increase the number of buyers and sellers,and the profit of platform.The platform which has less cost of tying product will get much more buyers,sellers and profitin competition case.The sumutility of buyers and sellers and social welfare will increase,when the number of tying preference buyers increases in both cases.