权力游戏与产业制度变迁——以中国石油产业外部合作战略转型为例（1988-2008）

1988-2008年间，中国石油产业外部合作战略实现了从早期以引进外国资本与技术为主要内容的“引进来”战略，向1998年后以输出资本与技术为主要特征的“走出去”战略的重要转型。本文以组织社会学决策分析的推论方式研究发现，作为一种产业制度变迁现象，中国石油产油产业外部合作战略的转型除了受到国家及其产业政策和市场机制的重要影响外，更深刻地受到一种复杂权力关系互动或权力游戏机制的作用。即中国石油产业外部合作战略转型深层的动力来源主要是国家和国有石油公司之间特定的权力游戏，这种权力游戏是基于各自行动能力与资源控制，和各自对特定的互动组织环境以及对方可能的行动策略的权衡与判断而建构起来的。

Power Game and Industrial Institutional Change： An Empirical Study on the Strategic Shift in the International Cooperation by the Chinese Oil Industry （1988- 2008）

From 1988 to 2008,the international cooperation of the Chinese oil industry underwent an important strategic shift from the initial " importing" (yin jing lai) of foreign capitals and technology to the "exporting" (zou chu qu) of capitals and technology after 1998.The core issue of this study was to reflect upon this significant shift and answer questions at the theoretical level.There exist two competing theories in this regard-the theoretical explanation that emphasizes the importance of nation’’s rational industrial policies from the perspective of new institutionalism in economic sociology,and the theoretical explanation that emphasizes market functions from neo-classic economics of industries.The current study attempted to get beyond of the inclination of a priori-rationality or structural determinism in the existing research by introducing the paradigm of strategic analysis of French organizational sociology in order to describe and analyze the hidden micro-political process during the industrial institutional change.The analysis was on four dimensions of actors’ differentiated targets,games’ organizational environments,actors’ action competencies and control of key resources,and actors’ action strategies.It was found that,as a phenomenon in an industrial institutional transformation,the strategic shift in the international cooperation by the Chinese oil industry was not only under the significant influences of the state,its industrial policies,and the market mechanism,but it was also,even to a greater extent,at the function of the dynamics of complex power relationships and the mechanisms in the power games.That means that the deeply-seated driving force for this strategic shift mainly came from a special power game between the central government (the state) and the state-owned oil companies in terms of their respective action ability and resource control as well as their respective balancing and judging of specific organizational environments in interaction and the other parties’ probable action strategies.