| 论代理权争夺的福利效应 |
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| 引用本文： | 殷醒民.论代理权争夺的福利效应[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),2000(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 殷醒民 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学经济学院!上海200433 |
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| 摘 要： | 代理权争夺是上市公司股东惩罚未能实现公司利润最大化的管理层的最后工具。当持有异议股东与管理者争夺公司代理权时 ,由于市场预期进行代理权争夺的公司可能会被兼并 ,所以股价会上升 ,股价上升也就提高了股东的收益 ,而代理权争夺的失败也就是股东财富的损失 ,这就可以部分地解释代理权竞争成功率较高的原因。因此 ,股东是代理权冲突的实际收益者
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| 关 键 词： | 代理权争夺 企业兼并 公司控制权 |
On the Welfare Effect of the Contention for Procuration |
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| Yin Xing,min.On the Welfare Effect of the Contention for Procuration[J].Fudan Journal(Social Sciences Edition),2000(5). |
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| Authors: | Yin Xing min |
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| Abstract: | Contention for procuration is the last resort for the shareholders of a listed company to punish the management who fail to maximize the company's profits. When the shareholders with objections contend with the management for procuration, the share price will go up, thus increasing the gains of the shareholders, The shareholders' failure in this contention means their loss of fortune. This can partly account for the comparatively high rate of success in the contention for procuration. Therefore, shareholders are the actual beneficiaries in the contention for procuration. |
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| Keywords: | contention for procuration annexation of enterprises control power |
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