基于声誉考虑的高管和控股股东策略演化博弈研究

在委托代理理论的框架下,基于中国上市公司单一控股股东特征的股权结构,分析中国上市公司高管与控股股东的委托代理问题对中国公司的治理有重要的作用.在高管与控股股东有限理性的假设前提下,文章引入了声誉激励机制的动态模型,运用演化博弈理论分析对高管实施激励过程中,高管是否努力工作的策略选择和控股股东是否选择监督的策略选择的互动机制,揭示了基于声誉考虑的高管和控股股东在委托代理关系中的演化进程,并对影响该动态系统稳定的关键因素进行分析.研究结果表明,演化博弈不存在最优的稳定策略,但存在三个局部稳定策略.文章最后提出通过结合股权和股票期权等显性激励,加大对有偷懒行为的高管处罚力度,通过聘用高声誉的高管发挥声誉的隐性激励作用等方法使演化博弈的策略向公司委托代理机制所期望达到的最优目标收敛.

Evolution game study on executives base on reputation considerations and controlling shareholders

Analyzing principal-agent problem between executives and controlling shareholders has very important roles based on the characteristic of single controlling shareholder in Chinese listing company under the framework of principal agent theory. This paper introduces reputation incentive mechanism based on the assumption of both executives and controlling shareholders are bounded rational. Then it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the process of motivate executives, the interactive mechanism of whether the executives work hard or not and whether controlling shareholders supervise or not. It reveals the evolutional process of executives and controlling shareholders in the principal-agent relationship based on the consideration of reputation. And then the paper analyzes the key factors which impact the stability of dynamic system. The results show that there doesn''t exist optimal stability strategy but with three local stability strategies. Finally, it proposes to design reasonable incentive mechanism in order to make principal-agent mechanism converge to an ideal state of optimal aim, through combined explicit incentive mechanism such as stock rights and stock option, beef up the penalties for shirking and opportunistic behaviors of executives and implicit incentive mechanism such as hire high reputation executives to make managers'' personal interest close to company interest.