农民工转户行为的演化博弈分析——以重庆为例

户籍制度是一项包含多种利益分配的身份制度,户籍改革意味着利益结构的大调整,必然面临复杂的博弈.在自愿选择的前提下,中国农民工户籍转变过程逐步趋向于政府与农民工基于成本利益估量的双向博弈.文章以博弈方法分析了当下农民工转户过程中农民工和政府策略影响因素及可能的均衡路径,得出结论为:现阶段政府推动农民工市民化的经济与政治利益大于所需成本,有动力主动推动农民工转户进程;农民工出于对转户后生活不确定性的考虑,需要政府适当保留其部分既有利益且提供切实有效的社会保障后对于转户才有持续积极性.为了推动农民工市民化进程的可持续稳定前进,政府可能在短期需要付出足够多的经济政策扶持;即便如此,对政府和农民工而言,这仍是一个双赢结果.最后以重庆户籍改革过程中的统计数据验证了分析结论并提供政策启示.

Evolutionary game theory analysis of migrant workers' household registration reform: Chongqing as an example

Household registration system is one involving a variety of complicated distribution of the benefits. Its reform means a major adjustment of interest structure, facing a complex game. Under the premise of voluntary choice, the process of household registration reform tends to be a game between government and migrant workers, considering their own costs and benefits. Here we take the game theory to analyze the strategy-factors as well as possible equilibrium path during the current household registration system reform of migrant workers. The conclusion of the analysis is that, at this stage, the profits of the household registration system reform is much more than the costs, thus the government has incentives to promote the census transformation of the migrant workers while the migrant workers needs more economic policy security support when making the choice to change their census and considering the uncertainty afterwards. Based on this situation, the government should reserve some vested interests of the migrant workers appropriately while providing effective social security services. To keep the urbanization process steady and sustainable, the government may give more input. Even though, it is a win-win denouement for the government and migrant workers. In the end, we use Chongqing household registration reform process to verify the analysis results while providing some policy implications.