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违反权益披露规则的法律责任分析
引用本文:王湘淳.违反权益披露规则的法律责任分析[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2021,27(1):191-202.
作者姓名:王湘淳
作者单位:中央财经大学法学院,北京 100881
基金项目:中国法学会2018年部级法学研究课题一般课题"公司法之功能嬗变及结构性革新研究"
摘    要:对于证券市场上违反权益披露规则的行为可以通过不同的法律责任予以惩处.采用何种法律责任进行惩处与权益披露规则的制度定位密切相关.经比较法考察,权益披露规则或纳入披露制度框架或纳入敌意收购制度框架.若纳入披露制度框架,主要通过金钱罚则进行惩处.若纳入敌意收购制度框架,主要通过限制表决权的方式进行惩处.借鉴域外经验,基于我国权益披露规则的既有制度定位,应当采用限制表决权的法律责任.限制表决权的法律责任依据实施主体的不同可分为私人主体实施的民事诉讼与证券监管机构实施的行政执法两种模式.依据我国的既有规定与制度环境,应当采用证券监管机构行政执法,限制表决权的实施模式,由此可以更好地在限制不当的收购行为与促进公司治理效率之间达至平衡.在此基础上,应当放松乃至取消慢走规则,降低收购成本,促进公司控制权市场发展,从而抵消限制表决权对控制权市场的负面影响,保持对公司收购的中立立场,让各方利益更好地达至平衡.

关 键 词:权益披露  上市公司收购  表决权限制  投资者保护  公力执法
修稿时间:2019/5/7 0:00:00

Legal liability in violation of the rules of report on a large number of holdings shares
WANG Xiangchun.Legal liability in violation of the rules of report on a large number of holdings shares[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2021,27(1):191-202.
Authors:WANG Xiangchun
Institution:Law school, Central University of Finance Economics, Beijing 100881, P. R. China
Abstract:There are many kinds of legal liability mechanisms in violation of the rules of report on a large number of holdings shares, and the setting of legal liability is closely related to the positioning of the rules of report on a large number of holdings shares. After comparative study, the rules of report on a large number of holdings shares in some countries are incorporated into the disclosure system framework and others are incorporated into the takeovers system framework. In the former, the main legal liability is money penalties. In the latter, the main legal liability is limiting the voting rights. The legal liability mechanism of limiting the right to vote can be divided into two modes:the civil action of the private subject and the law enforcement of the public authority. According to the existing normative path and institutional environment in China, it is advisable to adopt the legal liability of limiting the voting power by the public authority, which can better strike a balance between restricting inappropriate takeovers and promoting the efficiency of corporate governance. On this basis, we should relax or even cancel the slow walking rule, reduce the takeover cost, and promote the development of corporate control market, so as to offset the negative impact of restricting voting rights on the control market, maintain a neutral position on corporate takeover, and better balance the interests of all parties.
Keywords:report on a large number of holdings shares  takeovers  limit the voting rights  investor protection  public enforcement
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