| 基于信号博弈的外资并购国有企业定价研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚海鑫,朱雅琴.基于信号博弈的外资并购国有企业定价研究[J].辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,38(5):12-17. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚海鑫 朱雅琴 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]辽宁大学商学院,辽宁沈阳110136 [2]沈阳工程学院技术经济系,辽宁沈阳110136 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金资助项目，辽宁省社科规划基金资助项目，辽宁大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 定价是外资并购国有企业能否成功的最关键因素,并购定价主要涉及外资企业与国有企业之间的一系列讨价还价过程,是一种典型的博弈行为。本文运用博弈理论与方法构建了外资并购国有企业定价的信号博弈模型,并进行博弈均衡分析。结果表明,在分离均衡下,定价信号可以真实地反映国有企业经营绩效的好坏,是一种最有效率的均衡。定价信号能为提高并购效率和成功率提供有益参考,为并购各方提供决策依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 外资并购 国有企业 定价 信号博弈 |
A Study of SOEs' Pricing in Foreign Investors' M&A Based on Signaling Games |
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| YAO Hai-xin,Zhu Ya-qin.A Study of SOEs' Pricing in Foreign Investors' M&A Based on Signaling Games[J].Jounal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition),2010,38(5):12-17. |
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| Authors: | YAO Hai-xin Zhu Ya-qin |
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| Institution: | 1.Business School,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China;2.Department of Technology and Economics,Shenyang Institute of Engineering,Shenyang 110136,China) |
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| Abstract: | Pricing is the most critical factor in foreign investors’ successful MA of SOEs.Mainly in-volving a series of bargains between foreign-funded enterprises and state-owned enterprise,MA pricing is a typical game behavior.This article employs game theory,constructs a signaling game model of SOEs’ pricing in foreign investors’ MA,and analyzes the game equilibrium.The result shows that in the separating equi-librium,pricing signals can truly reflect the state-owned enterprises’ operational performance.Pricing signals can enhance the efficiency and success rate of MA,and provide beneficial reference for merging parties to make smart decisions. |
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| Keywords: | foreign investors’ M＆A state-owned enterprises（SOE） pricing signaling games |
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