| 乡镇煤矿安全事故频发的博弈视角分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐雪高,季牧青,沈杰.乡镇煤矿安全事故频发的博弈视角分析[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(5):23-26. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐雪高 季牧青 沈杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国人民大学,农业与农村发展学院,北京,100872 |
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| 摘 要： | 从矿难事故参与的四大微观主体中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业、矿工角度出发,通过构建中央政府—地方政府—煤矿企业和煤矿企业—矿工2个博弈模型,分析了乡镇煤矿安全事故频发的原因。结果表明,从监管角度看,需要通过多种渠道,多管齐下对乡镇煤矿进行治理,特别是要削弱其与地方政府的经济联系;从雇佣角度看,解决矿难问题还在于扩大农民的非农就业渠道。
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| 关 键 词： | 乡镇煤矿 安全事故 博弈 |
Analysis of Frequent Occurrence of Safety Accidents in Township and Village Mines from Game Theory |
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| XU Xue-gao,JI Mu-qing,SHEN Jie.Analysis of Frequent Occurrence of Safety Accidents in Township and Village Mines from Game Theory[J].Journal of Beijing Polytechnic University(Social Sciences Edition),2008,8(5):23-26. |
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| Authors: | XU Xue-gao JI Mu-qing SHEN Jie |
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| Institution: | XU Xue-gao JI Mu-qing SHEN Jie (School of Agricultural Economics , Rural Development,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China) |
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| Abstract: | In the perspective of four main players in mine accidents:central government, local government,mine enterprises,miners,we build two game models to analyse the cause of frequent occurrence of safety accidents in town and village mines.One is the game model between central government and local governments coal mine enterprises.The other game model is between coal mine enterprises and miners.The results show that from the regulatory perspective,we should manage the township and village mines by means of a vari... |
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| Keywords: | township and village mines safety accidents game theory |
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