| 政府信用缺失的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜生权.政府信用缺失的经济学分析[J].长春工程学院学报(社会科学版),2010,11(2):71-74. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜生权 |
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| 作者单位： | 福建师范大学,公共管理学院,福州,350007 |
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| 摘 要： | 从经济人假设出发,以委托代理理论和信息不对称理论阐述政府信用缺失的前提和基础,通过博弈理论分析政府信用缺失的机理,最后运用成本收益理论深层揭示政府信用缺失的原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府信用 信用缺失 成本收益 |
Economic analysis of the causes on government's breaking promises |
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| DU Sheng-quan.Economic analysis of the causes on government''s breaking promises[J].Journal of Changchun Institute of Technology(Social Science Edition),2010,11(2):71-74. |
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| Authors: | DU Sheng-quan |
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| Institution: | DU Sheng-quan(Public Administration College,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350007,China) |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,starting from the assumption that economic man to the principal-agent theory and the theory of asymmetric information,it explains the administration's lack of credit based on the premise and,through game theory analysis of the mechanism of loss of government credit,and finally reveals the government's deep-seated reasons for lack of credit from the use of cost-benefit theory. |
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| Keywords: | credibility of government lacking of credibility cost revenue |
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