集合行为何以发生?城镇化进程中“种房”行为演化的双因素机制研究

将城镇化进程中的农民“种房”视为一种集合行为,运用过程-事件分析法,分析了政府干预与信息传播两种社会控制因素在“种房”行为演化过程中的作用。研究发现:在政府不干预和信息碎片化条件下,乡村精英的示范效应和意见领袖效应促进了“种房”行为的发酵。在政府弱干预和信息变异式传播条件下,政府行政干预中的规范变通行为,强化了村民对“种房”收益和风险的认知偏差;信息的变异式扩散强化了“种房”收益预期,遮蔽了“种房”风险信息,从而使“种房”行为愈演愈烈。在政府强干预与信息还原条件下,“种房”的成本大于收益,“种房”行为停止。政府干预的迟滞性和信息不对称是“种房”这类集合行为发生的重要原因。据此提出,农民“种房”行为的治理应着眼于强化用地规划的前瞻性、健全“种房”应急处置机制和强化“种房”治理规范的刚性。

How Does the Collective Behavior Happen? Study on the Two-factor Evolution Mechanism of Villagers’ Overbuilding Behavior in the Process of Urbanization

Regarding villagers’overbuilding behavior in the process of government land acquisition in urbanization as a collective behavior,this paper analyzes the function of government’s intervention and information dissemination in the evolution process of villagers’overbuilding behavior by using the event history analysis method.The study found that under the condition of government non-intervention and information fragmentation,the demonstration effect and opinion leadership effect of rural elites promoted the fermentation of overbuilding behavior.Under the condition of weak government intervention and information mutation,the normative flexibility behavior in the governmental administrative intervention strengthened villagers’cognitive bias on the income and risk of overbuilding,and the mutated spread of information strengthened villagers’income expectation on overbuilding behavior,and obscured the corresponding risk information,which in turn intensified the overbuilding behavior.Under the condition of strong government intervention and information restoration,villagers realized the cost of overbuilding was greater than the expected income and then stopped.Above all,the delay of government intervention and information asymmetry are crucial causes of collective behavior like overbuilding.It is supposed to strengthen the foresight of land planning,improve emergency response mechanism and reinforce the governance norms.