食品安全共同监管的多主体博弈

通过对食品安全监管过程中政府监管部门、食品行业生产企业和社会组织等主要行动主体进行博弈分析，发现：政府与生产企业的“监管—被监管”关系一直处于变动状态，主要表现为政府增强监管力度，促使生产企业规范生产，保障食品安全监管效果；而高昂的监管成本让政府不得不降低监管概率，从而为生产企业机会主义行为选择提供了空间，导致食品安全事件频发，政府继续增强监管力度。此时，政府选择与社会组织进行合作监管的概率决定了社会组织选择合作的演化稳定结果，影响了食品安全共同监管体系的建立；政府与社会组织在监管过程中的沟通协调成本以及对生产企业的监管力度，需要在多元主体参与的协同共治中不断探索和明确。

Multi agent Game Analysis of Co regulation on Food Safety

Base on the game analysis of multi agent in the process of food safety regulation, such as government departments, food producers and social organizations, it can be found that the relationship between government and producers is always in a state of change, the main performance is that the government strengthens regulation, urges the producers to standardize the production, guarantees the food safety supervision effect. However, the high regulatory cost makes the government have to reduce the regulatory probability, thus providing space for producers to choose opportunistic behaviors, leading to frequent food safety incidents, and the government has to continue to strengthen regulation. At this time, the probability that the government chooses cooperative regulation with social organizations determines the stable evolutionary result of cooperative cooperation between social organizations and affects the establishment of co regulation system for food safety. In the process of regulation, the cost of communication and coordination between the government and social organizations and the intensity of regulation over producers need to be explored and clarified in the collaborative governance involving multiple actors.