基于食品安全的企业、监管部门动态博弈分析

通过建立食品企业与监管部门问的动态博弈模型，并结合三鹿事件分析，认为食品企业出于短期利益考虑可能忽视产品质量，并对监管部门行贿；而监管部门出于自身利益，可能放松对企业的监管行为；对食品企业免检会导致企业忽视食品安全；作为社会利益的代表，政府必须承担起相应责任。提出，结合新的食品安全法加强法治的同时，还需要重视营造食品安全的软环境。

Dynamic Game between Enterprise and Supervision Department in View of Food Safety

This article analyzes the reasons why food safety problems often arise in China from the game view.It sets up dynamic game models of food production enterprises with regulatory authorities.It points out that enterprises may neglect product quality owing to short-term interests,and the supervision system is therefore not feasible.The government should intensify the punishment of insecure food enterprises,enhance the regulation of the secure food enterprises and help to improve their technical and managerial ...