公平偏好下双重逆向选择的激励契约设计及效率分析

传统的逆向选择模型建立在代理人“纯粹自利”的假设基础之上，忽略了人的公平心理偏好对激励契约的影响。从个体心理偏好的异质性出发，将作为隐藏信息的公平偏好心理因素嵌入传统逆向选择模型，设计出当代理人能力水平和心理偏好特征均为私有信息时的最优契约，可以发现公平偏好以及双重逆向选择的信息结构对于最优激励契约及其实施效率的影响。结果表明：双重逆向选择情形下最优契约是“部分混同”的，而公平心理会导致部分代理人通过隐藏其真实心理偏好以获取额外信息租金。最优契约是在信息租金抽取、公平心理补偿与配置效率之间权衡产生的结果，因此与传统的逆向选择情形相比，公平偏好会导致低能力代理人的配置向下扭曲变大，而不同能力代理人之间的收入差距会随公平心理强度增加而增大。

Incentive Contract Design and Efficiency Analysis for Double Adverse Selection Under Fairness Preference

Traditional adverse selection model is based on the assumption of pure selfish agent,igno-ring the influence of peoples’fairness preferences on the incentive contract.In view of this,starting from the heterogeneous psychological preference of a person,embedding fairness preference as hiding information into the traditional adverse selection model,this paper designed the optimal contract of which the abilities and psychological preferences of agents both were private information,and then an-alyzed the influence of fairness preference and information structure of double adverse selection on the optimal contract and its implementation efficiency.The result shows that when the principal faces the double adverse selection,the optimal contract are partly pooling,and so fairness preference can make some agents get information rents by hiding their true psychological preference.The optimal contract is induced by a tradeoff between information rent,inequity premium fairness and efficiency.Thus fair-ness preference aggravates distortion of low-efficient agent’s production compared to the traditional ad-verse selection model and the income gap between different efficient agents is relative positively to the degree of fairness preference.