国有企业混合所有制改革下股东利益博弈分析

国有企业混合所有制改革是当前理论探讨的热点。以分权控制理论为基础,构建国有股东、民营股东和监督机构三方的利益博弈模型,并对模型进行分析。结果显示,国有股东侵占民营股东的概率受监督机构监督成本和国有股东被监督损失等因素的影响,监督机构选择自主监督国有股东的概率受国有股东侵占行为惩罚力度系数、国有股东侵占额外收益和民营股东诉讼赔偿等因素影响。要加强对国有股东的惩罚力度,发挥好政府的监督作用,增强中小股东权利保障机制,推进国有企业混合所有制改革的步伐。

Analysis of shareholder interest game in mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises

The reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises is a hot topic in current theoretical exploration.Based on the theory of decentralized control, an interest game model is constructed among state-owned shareholders, private shareholders and supervisory organizations, and the model is studied.According to the research results, the probability of state-owned shareholders encroaching on private shareholders is influenced by cost of supervision by supervisory agencies and state shareholders are being monitored for losses, etc.The probability of independent supervision of state-owned shareholders is influenced by coefficient of punishment intensity when state-owned shareholders commit embezzlement, additional benefits from the expropriation of state shareholders and litigation compensation to be paid by private shareholders.The penalties for state shareholders need to be toughened, and the oversight role of the government should be given full role.The protection mechanism should be strengthened for the rights of minority shareholders so as to promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.