| 基于信号博弈的网络购物信息不对称研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张景博,马腾,陈霞,吕廷杰.基于信号博弈的网络购物信息不对称研究[J].北京邮电大学学报(北京邮电大学学报),2013(5):45-50. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张景博 马腾 陈霞 吕廷杰 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 北京邮电大学经济管理学院;北京语言大学对外汉语研究中心 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2012CB315805);国家自然科学基金项目(71172135,71231002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2013RC0603) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 网络购物作为当今的主流消费形式之一，因其信息的不对称性，给交易双方带来了很大障碍，极大地降低了网络交易市场的效率。为了解决网络购物市场低效率的问题，本文利用博弈论方法，建立了网络购物买卖双方的信号博弈模型，针对商家采取的不同策略求解，最终提出了在信息不对称的网络购物市场下，保护消费者权益的各项措施和建议。
|
| 关 键 词： | 网络购物 信号博弈 信息不对称 伪装成本 |
Information Asymmetry of Online Shopping Based on Signaling Game Model |
| |
| ZHANG Jing-bo;MA Teng;CHEN Xia;LV Ting-jie.Information Asymmetry of Online Shopping Based on Signaling Game Model[J].Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition),2013(5):45-50. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Jing-bo;MA Teng;CHEN Xia;LV Ting-jie |
| |
| Institution: | ZHANG Jing-bo;MA Teng;CHEN Xia;LV Ting-jie;School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications;Centre for Studies of Chinese as a Second Language,Beijing Language ane Culture University; |
| |
| Abstract: | Nowadays, online shopping has become one of the mainstream form of consumption. However, infor- mation asymmetry brings a big obstacle to the transaction parties, which leads to inefficiencies of online trading market. In order to solve the inefficient market, a signaling game model of buyers and sellers of online shopping is established through game theory method. Aiming at quantitatively analyzing the different strategies taken by merchants, the consumer protection measures and recommendations are provided. |
| |
| Keywords: | online shopping signaling game information asymmetry pretend cost |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录！ |
