关于全国人大应否被纳入宪法监督范围的思考

宪法监督制度能否有效运转必须置于人民代表大会制度下予以考量。绝对主义地理解人民代表大会的最高权力机关地位,从其不应受法律上所设置机关的监督的政治逻辑推论,将导致实践困境。在宪政的话语重新厘定和审视人民代表大会地位、人民代表大会与宪法的关系问题,是化解中国宪法监督制度尴尬的关键。人民代表大会不能简单等同于人民意志,专门机关的宪法监督机制的设立并不会导致民主背反的理论难题。宪法监督制度的完善与有效发挥作用,还需考量宪法监督体制之外,特别是政治体制方面的制约与影响。区别规范性审查与基本权利救济的特殊性,交由不同的机关分别应对不失为理性选择。

THINKING ON INCLUDING THE NPC IN THE SUPERVISION SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION

Whether constitutional supervision system can function effectively must be taken into account under the People＇ s Congress system. Absolutist understanding of the status of the highest authority of the People＇ s Congress and the fnferenee drawn fi＇om the political logic that the People＇ s Congress should not be supervised by any legal institutions would result in a practical dilemma. Re-examining and reviewing the status of the People＇ s Congress in the constitutional discourse and the issue of the relationship between the People＇ s Congress snd the Constitution is the key to resolving the embarrsssing oversight system of the Chinese Constitution. The People＇ s Congress can not be simply equated with the will of the people and the establishing of the oversight mechanisms of specialized agencies will not incur the theoretical problem of anti-democracy. In addition in the constitutional supervision system, the improvement and effective functioning of the constitutional supervision system can not be made without taking into consideration the constraints and impact of the political system in particular. Regulatory review must be differentiated from the particularity of fundamental right relief. A rationl choice is to deal with them separately by different agencies.