过渡时期地方政府与中央政府的纵向博弈及其经济效应

中国渐进性改革的一个重要特征，是通过向地方行政性分权战略，形成地方政府推动经济增长的主体格局，造就了地方政府独立的经济利益。中央与地方之间不再是简单的行政隶属关系，而是带有相当程度的对等博弈主体角色。地方政府业已成为具有独立利益和目标取向的经济主体，地方与中央的利益博弈不仅对经济资源在二者间的分配产生决定性影响，而且对整个社会经济增长格局和资源配置效率具有间接的经济效应。

Interest Game Between Local Governments and the Central Government and its Economic Effects

A significant feature of the progressive economic reforms in China is that the central government transferred its controlling power to local governments. This strategy forms the main pattern that local governments help boost economic growth, and create independent economic interests. The central government and local governments no longer maintain what is called the simple administrative superior-subordinate relationship. Instead, an equal gamerelationship has developed between them. local governments have become economic main bodies with independent interests and goal orientations. The interest game between the central goverment and local goverment will not only have a decisive influence on the distribution of economic resources between them, but also have an indirect economic effect on the economic growth pattern and the efficiency of the resource distribution.