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矿难频发的法经济学分析
引用本文:曹飞.矿难频发的法经济学分析[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,8(4):79-86.
作者姓名:曹飞
作者单位:浙江大学,经济学院,浙江,杭州,310027
基金项目:教育部新世纪人才资助研究基金
摘    要:本文从法经济学的角度,分析了矿难发生的主要原因:矿工在矿难频发的背景下依然选择采矿是其“理性选择”,是因为二元劳动力市场、其自身素质以及高额的补偿工资使然;对于矿主来说,当下的法律责任设定和法律执行的情况还不足以使其进行卓有成效的安全措施和适量采矿进而减少矿难;国家相关机关的工作人员与矿主勾结,形成利益共同体,变为“规制的俘虏”,降低监管的作用。本文并就此提出了对策与反思。

关 键 词:法经济学  理性选择  官煤勾结
文章编号:1009-105X(2006)04-0079-08
修稿时间:2006年10月9日

Analysis of Law and Economics for the Frequent Mining Calamities
CAO Fei.Analysis of Law and Economics for the Frequent Mining Calamities[J].Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences),2006,8(4):79-86.
Authors:CAO Fei
Abstract:From the perspective of law and economics,the paper analyzes the basic cause of mining calamities.The choice of mining job is the "rational choice" of miners, just because of dual labour market,their capabilities and higher wages as well;as for the mine bosses,the current law responsibilities and law enforcement is not strong and severe enough for them to take effective measures and proper mining to reduce mine calamities;the collusion of the relevant officials and mine bosses formed interest community that,became the captive of rules and regulations,thus reducing supervision.The paper brings forward the measurements and reflection.
Keywords:law and economics  rational choice  collusion of officials and mine bosses
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