| 城市商业银行与中小企业的信贷博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 蒋学众.城市商业银行与中小企业的信贷博弈研究[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,12(3):40-43. |
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| 作者姓名： | 蒋学众 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏银行,徐州分行,江苏,徐州,221003 |
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| 摘 要： | 中小企业在我国经济建设中起着不可低估的作用,也是城市商业银行的主要服务对象。但是由于中小企业的特点,城市银行和中小企业之间存在着更为严重的信息非对称,从而加大了银行的风险,也限制了中小企业在我国经济建设中作用的发挥。为了解决这一问题,本文从信息经济学的角度对城市商业银行与中小企业的信贷博弈进行了研究,并进行分析,对城市商业银行选择占优战略进行了阐述。
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| 关 键 词： | 城市商业银行 信贷风险 中小企业 |
Credit Game Between City Commercial Banks and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises |
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| JIANG Xue-zhong.Credit Game Between City Commercial Banks and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises[J].Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences),2010,12(3):40-43. |
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| Authors: | JIANG Xue-zhong |
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| Institution: | JIANG Xue-zhong(Xuzhou Branch,Bank of Jiangsu,Xuzhou 221003,China) |
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| Abstract: | Small and medium-sized enterprises（SMEs） play an important role in Chinese economic construction and are the major clients of city commercial banks.However,serious information asymmetry between city commercial banks and SMEs due to the characteristics of SMEs increase the risks of the banks and limit the real function of SMEs in the economic development of China.To solve this problem,this paper analyses the credit relation of SMEs and city commercial banks on game theory from the perspective of information economics and illustrates dominant strategies in city commercial banks. |
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| Keywords: | commercial bank credit risk small and medium-sized enterprises |
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